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Affiliates of German firms in Eastern Europe differ from those in the rest of the world. They 
have smaller sales and they employ more labor. Labor productivity is thus lower than in 
affiliates of German firms elsewhere. Moreover, multinational activity in Eastern Europe is 
mostly unilaterally whereas, for industrialized countries, bilateral FDI linkages dominate. In 
this paper, we aim at explaining differences in the activities of German multinational firms in 
Eastern and Western Europe. Do German firms engage in different activities in Eastern and 
Western Europe, i.e. do the types of affiliates differ? Or do smaller German parent firms 
particularly benefit from enlargement, i.e. do characteristics of the parents differ in a 
systematic way?  
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1   Motivation 
 
Affiliates of German firms in Eastern Europe differ from those in the rest of the world. They 
have smaller sales, and they employ relatively more labor. Table 1 shows that the transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe accounted for 7% of the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) of German firms abroad at the end of 2003. Their share in the numbers of employees 
(22.7%) and in the number of affiliates (15.7%) was significantly higher. Average sales per 
affiliate are only half of the value observed for developed countries. Labor productivity is thus 
lower than in affiliates of German firms elsewhere. Moreover, multinational activity in 
Eastern Europe is mostly unilateral whereas, for industrialized countries, bilateral FDI 
linkages dominate.  
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here. --- 
 
These new patterns of integration have raised an intense public debate on the costs and 
benefits of globalization in Germany – just as in many other developed countries. Eastern 
enlargement is often viewed as the key trigger of small and mid-sized firms into foreign 
markets, thus exposing the German economy and German workers to a new threat of 
international competition. 
 
Policy discussions on the role of multinational firms in the new EU member states differ from 
those in the West. Although, as in the West, people fear adverse labor market effects of 
multinational activity, they do so for different reasons. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) may 
feel less committed to preserving employment than domestic firms, hence restructuring firms 
and laying off workers more easily. Although the overall employment effects of more MNE 
activity are likely to be positive, uncertainty and the need for a flexible adjustment of the 
labor market may increase. Also, if large foreign firms enter, this may put increased 
competitive pressure on the incumbent domestic firms. 
 
Two key characteristics of multinational firms are thus central to the policy debate. The first 
is the size of firms. If small and mid-sized firms start investing abroad, globalization may 
affect also those firms of the Western economies that have previously not been able to 
relocate production. For the destination countries of FDI, large rather than small entrants may 
be a concern as large entrants may increase competitive pressure.  
 
The second characteristic of multinational firms that is important to the policy debate is their 
labor intensity. If multinationals that invest in Eastern Europe are relatively labor intensive, 
this may have positive effects on the labor markets in the host economies, but these benefits 
may come at the expense of employment in the source countries of FDI. 
 
In this paper, we document and explain differences with regard to the size and the labor 
intensity of German multinationals in Eastern and Western Europe. We argue that the 
observed differences can originate from three distinct sources. 
 
First, foreign affiliates of multinational firms differ across countries because they perform 
different functions. If foreign affiliates are set up in order to save production costs in general 
and labor costs in particular, they are likely to be more labor intensive than their parents. If, 
however, foreign affiliates are set up in order to improve market access, differences in the 
labor intensity between the affiliate and the parent are likely to be less pronounced. 
   3
Second, differences in the size and in the labor intensity of the affiliate might reflect 
differences in parent characteristics. Recent models of multinational firm stress the impact of 
differences in productivity of the parent for the choice of entry (see, e.g., Helpman et al. 
2004). According to these models, firms self-select into different groups of multinational 
firms. The most productive firms set up production facilities abroad and sell their products on 
the foreign market. The least productive firms stay at home and service only the domestic 
market. The size of firms in each group is country-specific. Thus, according to these models, 
countries with low entry barriers would host more and on average smaller foreign affiliates. 
 
Third, irrespective of the purpose that a foreign affiliate serves and the productivity of the 
parent, differences in the age of affiliates may explain differences in the size of affiliates. 
Ceteris paribus, older firms tend to be larger than their younger counterparts. Finding that 
smaller affiliates are active in Eastern Europe might thus reflect the fact that multinational 
activity in Central and Eastern Europe started only in the 1990s. 
 
An additional reason for differences in affiliate structures could be differences in factor 
endowments across countries. Even if affiliates in different countries perform the same 
functions, their labor intensities are likely to differ if countries have different factor 
endowments. For example, a pure sales outlet in a country with low labor costs is likely to be 
more labor intensive than a pure sales outlet in a country with high labor costs. However, we 
cannot test this effect of factor endowments because we cannot isolate it from the other 
influences mentioned above.  
 
To explore why characteristics of German foreign affiliates in Eastern and Western Europe 
differ, we make use of a novel dataset provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. For a couple of 
years now, the Bundesbank has provided external researchers with access to its firm-level 
database ‘International Capital Links’, which has detailed information on the foreign affiliates 
of German firms abroad (and on affiliates of foreign firms in Germany). The data start in 
1989. Until recently, essentially no information on the German parent firms has been 
available. For the years 2002-2003, however, selected additional information has been 
provided on the German reporting firm. Hence we can use this additional information to 
obtain evidence on heterogeneity across parents. 
 
The focus of this paper is on German data for two interrelated reasons. First, Germany is one 
of the largest investor in Eastern Europe. Almost one third of all FDI into the region comes 
from German firms. The second and third most important investors, the Netherlands and 
Austria, follow with shares of only 14 and 9%, respectively. Hence although we focus only on 
one source country of FDI, our analysis yet captures a significant share of FDI into Eastern 
Europe. Second, in contrast to evidence for other important source countries of FDI into 
Eastern Europe, firm-level data are available for German firms. Hence, we can disentangle the 
impact of affiliate and of parent characteristics, which would not be feasible using aggregated 
data. 
 
This is not the first paper to study the activities of German firms in Eastern Europe. Earlier 
work has used mainly aggregated data. (For a survey of the evidence see Toubal (2004).) 
More recently, firm-level data have been used as well. First results of Becker et al. (2005) and 
Marin (2004) show that jobs in domestic and foreign plants of German firms are substitutes, 
but that total job losses through foreign direct investment are quite low. Buch et al. (2005) 
provide a detailed analysis of the determinants of German firms’ foreign activities, but their 
research does not focus on differences between Eastern and Western Europe. They find that, 
overall, German FDI is mostly driven by the market access motive.   4
This paper differs from earlier research in two main regards. First, we focus on German FDI 
in Eastern Europe using data at different levels of aggregation. As earlier studies on German 
FDI, we use sectoral and aggregated data to obtain a broad picture of the determinants of 
multinational activity. However, these data do not allow the different determinants of affiliate 
characteristics to be disentangled. Hence the second innovation of this paper is that we use 
firm-level data to identify the factors that contribute to the systematic differences of German 
firms’ foreign affiliates.  
 
This paper has five main parts. In the following Part 2, we briefly review the theoretical 
literature on multinational firms. We discuss the implications of models that focus on the 
different functions that foreign affiliates can serve as well as on the implications of recent 
theoretical work emphasizing heterogeneity of parents. In Part 3, we provide a set of 
descriptive statistics. These provide an intuition why the patterns of German multinationals in 
Eastern Europe differ from those in the rest of the world. In Part 4, we study these patterns in 
a regression-based framework, using data aggregated by host country, sector-level data, and 
firm-level data. Part 5 concludes. We find that German firms expand into Eastern Europe 
both, in order to improve market access and in order to reduce production costs. The 
production cost motive is somewhat more important than for FDI activity in Western Europe. 
Contrary to expectations, multinational parents that are active in Eastern Europe are larger, on 
average, than the typical German multinational. Production in Eastern Europe is also 
relatively labor intensive. 
 
 
2    Motives for Internationalization: Theoretical Background 
 
Exploring the different motives for the internationalization of production has been an 
important theme in the literature on multinational firms in recent years. (See for surveys 
Markusen (2002) or Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004)). This research has stressed two 
main reasons for setting up affiliates abroad: lowering production costs and lowering costs of 
market access. Below, we review the implications of these models. We also sketch 
implications of recent theoretical models which put emphasis on differences in parent 
characteristics to endogenously derive the decision to invest in a foreign country. 
 
2.1   Production Costs versus Market Access 
 
Evidence provided in Table 1 shows that affiliates of German firms in Eastern Europe differ 
from affiliates in other countries along some key dimensions. What is it that can explain these 
differences? One possible answer to this question lies in the different purposes that foreign 
affiliates can fulfill. In the literature, two main motives for setting up affiliates abroad are 
being distinguished. 
 
According to the first motive for internationalization, firms internationalize production and 
become multinationals because they aim at reducing production costs. Hence these firms split 
up the production process and relocate labor intensive stages of production into countries 
richly endowed with labor. They take advantage of existing factor-price differentials between 
countries to relocate production across borders. Relocation of production takes place 
according to the comparative advantages of countries (Helpman 1984). Multinational firms 
that emerge in this framework are vertically integrated as they conduct different activities in   5
different locations. If factor-price considerations are behind the internationalization of 
production, we should see 
 
o  one-directional FDI flows from capital-, management-, or human capital-rich (developed) 
countries to countries richly endowed with labor (developing countries) 
 
o  activities of multinational firms that increase in the degree of dissimilarity in factor 
endowments between countries, and  
 
o  multinational firms which have foreign affiliates specializing in different stages of 
production than their domestic headquarters.  
 
 
A priori, considering the differences in factor endowments between Eastern and Western 
Europe, we might expect factor-price considerations to play a more important role for the 
expansion of German firms into Eastern compared to Western Europe. However, for countries 
richly endowed with labor, there is an additional driving force of internationalization. Before 
turning to the empirical evidence, we discuss the second motive for internationalization of 
production – market access. 
 
According to the second motive for internationalization, multinationals are vehicles to 
overcome distance and to facilitate access to foreign markets (see, e.g. Krugman 1983, 
Brainard 1993, Markusen and Venables 1998, Markusen 2002). In this framework, firms have 
different channels for entering a foreign market. Each of these channels incurs different costs. 
A firm has the choice between producing at home and exporting final products to a foreign 
market (which involves variable ‘distance costs’) and producing abroad (which involves the 
additional fixed costs of setting up a second plant in the host country).  
 
Firms thus face a trade off between producing abroad in order to maximize proximity to the 
customer or to concentrate production in order to exploit economies of scale. Multinational 
firms in this framework are horizontally integrated as they produce the same product in two 
plants. Parents and affiliates perform the same types of activity, and they differ only with 
respect to location. Moreover, the headquarter unit produces a so-called headquarter service, 
which embodies the specific advantage of the firm. This service can be used in both plants at 
the same time in a non-rivalry manner. If the market access motive is behind the 
internationalization of production, we should see  
 
o  two-directional FDI flows as countries can be the home and the host of multinational 
firms at the same time 
 
o  that activities of multinational firms increase in the degree of similarity of countries, 
and  
 
o  multinational firms that conduct the same activities at home and abroad. 
 
 
Distinguishing between production cost and market access driven FDI is important because 
the labor market implications differ. Since FDI driven by the market access motive takes 
place on a bilateral basis and since it helps expanding output markets, labor market 
implications are positive. Source-country labor market implications of FDI that is driven by 
the production cost motive, in contrast, are more likely to be negative. This type of FDI still   6
helps lowering costs and thus improving the overall competitiveness, but employment of low-
skilled workers may fall if labor-intensive stages of production are moved to foreign 
countries.  
 
Empirically, multinational activity is of course driven by production cost and by market 
access considerations. Hence by simply looking at a particular multinational firm, we cannot 
decide which of the two dominates. However, regression-based empirical methods help us to 
identify which of the different motives for internationalization is empirically more important. 
We will return to this issue in Part 4 below. 
 
2.2  Firm Heterogeneity and the Choice of Entry 
 
Theoretical work invoked so far helps explaining differences in affiliate structures through 
differences in the functions that these affiliates perform. The models work with the 
assumption that a representative firm exists. This assumption does not, however, square with 
the empirical evidence. Generally, the size distribution of firms is approximately log-normal 
(Cabral and Mata 2003). For foreign affiliates, the same distribution can be found (Buch et al. 
2005). UNCTAD (2001) reports a strong concentration in outward FDI among parent firms. 
Even for the United States, which have a relatively diversified structure of foreign direct 
investment, the 50 largest parent firms account for more than half of total outward FDI stocks.  
 
Firms are thus heterogeneous, and heterogeneity matters because large and more productive 
firms tend to expand internationally. In representative firm models, self-selection of firms into 
different groups is not an issue. Yet, self-selection might be the source of the different 
characteristics of German multinational firms’ affiliates in Eastern and Western European 
countries. The heterogeneous firm model of Helpman et al. (2004), which is based on Melitz 
(2003), helps getting an intuition whether different characteristics of German firms’ foreign 
affiliates mirror differences among their parents. 
 
In Helpman et al. (2004), foreign direct investment (FDI) is assumed to be horizontal. The 
new feature of Helpman et al. (2004) is that the model assumes heterogeneity among firms 
with respect to their productivity. In the initial period, productivity is drawn by each firm 
from a common distribution. Depending on their productivity, firms then select themselves 
into groups, which differ in their choice of whether and how to supply the foreign market.  
 
Selection into domestic and foreign markets depends on the fixed costs of entering each 
market. Producing and selling only domestically involves the lowest fixed costs, exporting 
involves fixed costs in an intermediate range, and investing abroad involves the highest fixed 
costs. The fixed costs of exporting can be thought of as the costs of setting up distribution 
networks. In addition, exporting to foreign countries involves (variable) iceberg transportation 
costs. Production abroad saves on these variable distance costs but involves higher fixed costs 
in the foreign country. 
 
Country-specific fixed costs, price levels, and market size affect affiliates’ characteristics. To 
see this, assume two identical foreign countries that differ only in the fixed costs of exporting 
and of setting up a new plant. The fixed costs are sufficiently low to allow production of some 
firms in both countries. For the most productive firms, it is profitable to produce in both 
countries. For less productive firms, it is profitable to produce in the country with lower fixed 
costs and to export to the other country. Even less productive firms export to both countries 
and still less productive firms export only to the country with the lower fixed costs of   7
exporting. The least productive firms produce only for the home country. Whether firms are 
domestic or international, or whether they engage in exports or in FDI, thus depends on their 
productivity relative to some critical productivity levels for each activity. 
 
The different productivity levels determine the self-selection of firms into the different 
groups. The model also has implications for the patterns of multinational activity across 
countries. First, the smallest (least productive) firm that exports to the country with low fixed 
costs is smaller (less productive) than the least productive firm that exports to the country 
with high fixed costs. Second, more firms are active in the country with low fixed costs. 
Third, since the group of firms active in the country with low fixed costs includes smaller 
(less productive) firms, the average size (productivity level) is lower in this country. Hence 
there is a monotonic correspondence from parent productivity to affiliates’ size. More 
specifically, lower average productivity translates into lower average size of affiliates in the 
country with lower fixed costs. 
 
The model shows that differences in the fixed costs of entry and in the productivity of the 
parent can explain differences in affiliate characteristics in Eastern and Western Europe. Since 
the opening up of Eastern Europe has lowered fixed costs of entry in these countries, it may 
have allowed small and medium-sized German firms to produce internationally. These firms 
are, according to this model, the least productive. If smaller firms are active in Eastern 
Europe, their affiliates should be smaller too. If size is positively related to capital intensity, 
the model could also explain the different characteristics of Eastern and Western European 
affiliates without reverting to different functions of foreign affiliates. 
 
 
3   Descriptive  Statistics 
 
Affiliates of German firms in Eastern Europe are smaller on average than their Western 
counterparts, and they employ relatively more labor. Are these differences in affiliate 
structures due to the different functions that these affiliates perform? Are they due to 
differences in parent characteristics? Or are they simply due to the fact that Eastern European 
affiliates are younger? In this section, we provide descriptive statistics based on a German 
firm-level dataset which provide a first answer to these questions. A detailed description of 
the data is given in the appendix. 
 
3.1  Production Costs versus Market Access 
 
To get a first intuition of the relative importance of the market access versus the production 
cost motive for internationalization, we look at the patterns of multinational activity across 
countries, at the sector patterns of German MNE activity, and at the sector classification of 
parents and affiliates. 
 
As regards the patterns of multinational activity across countries, Table 2 shows that FDI into 
Eastern Europe is mostly unilateral whereas FDI among the more developed OECD countries 
is mostly bilateral. Hence there is relatively little FDI going from the Eastern European 
countries into the OECD region.  
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here. ---   8
We next look at the sector composition of German firms’ foreign affiliates to analyze whether 
affiliates in Eastern and Western Europe carry out different functions. Since factor intensities 
differ across sectors, we would expect to find differences in the regional patterns of sectoral 
investment if factor endowments matter for the locational choice.  
 
Table 3 shows the sector composition of German parents and their foreign affiliates in Eastern 
and Western Europe. The group of Eastern European countries includes the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The group of 
Western European countries, which we use for comparison, includes Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. We focus on 
this group of ‘core’ EU countries for two reasons. First, this is a group of countries which has 
factor endowments similar to those of Germany. For these countries, we expect a dominance 
of the market access motive. Second, the countries in core Europe are in similar geographical 
proximity to Germany as the new EU member states. Hence this choice of countries reduces 
the potential selection bias which might arise from differences in geographic distance. 
 
--- Insert Table 3 about here. --- 
 
With regard to the sector of the parent, Table 3 reveals relatively small differences in the 
broad patterns of activities in Eastern and Western Europe. The manufacturing sector 
accounts for about 60-70% of the total activity. Services firms make up an additional 30-40%. 
This pattern is relatively similar for FDI stocks, affiliates’ sales, and the number of 
employees. Using the capital of the affiliates as a measure of the relatively importance of 
sectors gives a different picture because of a dominance of financial services firms. These 
firms alone account for 42% of the capital of affiliates in Eastern Europe and an even higher 
66% in Western Europe. Looking at the data at a more disaggregated level, differences and 
similarities between the two regions become apparent. In terms of FDI stocks, the electricity 
sector ranks second in both regions, accounting for about 15% of total FDI stocks. However, 
the most important sector is transport equipment in the East – for which the production cost 
motive is likely to be important – and financial services in the West – for which the market 
access motive is likely to be important. 
 
With regard to the sector of the foreign affiliates, differences between the two regions become 
even more pronounced. Service sectors are much more important in Western Europe than in 
Eastern Europe with about 30% to 50% of the total. This holds regardless of what measure of 
activities we use. Again, if we look at FDI or affiliates’ capital, the much greater importance 
of financial services in Western Europe drives this result. If we look at affiliates’ sales, the 
wholesale sector, which is much more important in Western Europe, dominates. If we look at 
employment, wholesales and business services are more important in Western than in Eastern 
Europe. Thus, there are differences in the sector composition of the foreign affiliates, 
although not in the sector composition of the German parent firms, which might explain the 




We also compare the sector classification of the German parent firm to the classification of 
their foreign affiliates at the firm-level. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the number of 
foreign affiliates that German parent firms maintain abroad by the sector of the investing firm 
and the foreign affiliate in Eastern Europe. The sector of the foreign affiliate is listed across 
the columns, and the sector of the German parent is listed down the rows. 
                                                 
2   Weichenrieder (2005) analyzes the determinants of foreign holding firms established by German parent 
firms in detail.   9
--- Insert Table 4 about here. --- 
 
The market access motive rules out foreign affiliates that conduct different activities as their 
parent firm. Thus, if the market access motive dominates, we would expect many entries on 
the diagonal or in the wholesale sector (sector 18). The production cost motive, in contrast, 
allows (although not necessitates) affiliates to be classified in a different sector. Thus, if 
affiliates and parent firm are not classified in the same sector, we can reject the market access 
motive. The converse is not true, however. If affiliate and parent are classified in the same 
sector, we cannot reject the production cost motive, because we know only the sector 
classification of firms but we know nothing about the actual activities that firms perform or 
the products they produce.  
 
Table 4 shows that foreign affiliates in Eastern Europe are mainly classified in the same sector 
as the parent firm. This pattern is particularly pronounced in manufacturing. For service 
activities, there is also a close correspondence of the sector of the parent and of the affiliate. 
At the same time, there is also a relatively large number of service affiliates which are owned 
by manufacturing firms. Although this type of FDI takes place in a different sector, it is likely 
to be driven by the market access motive. About two-thirds (66 %) of all affiliates are 
classified in the same sector as their parent firm. Parent firms from manufacturing own mostly 
affiliates in the same sector (62.8%) or in wholesale (22.7%). Only 9.1% of all affiliates of 
manufacturing parent are classified in a different manufacturing sector. By and large, this 
confirms evidence for all affiliates of German firms (Buch et al. 2005). 
 
3.2  Firm Heterogeneity and the Choice of Entry 
 
The descriptive statistics presented so far provide preliminary information on the functions 
that affiliates might serve in different countries. They were based on the idea that different 
motives to enter a foreign country shape the differences between the foreign affiliates of 
German multinational firms. Yet, models with heterogeneous firms suggest that the interplay 
of firm heterogeneity and country characteristics might also generate the systematic 
differences between foreign affiliates in Eastern and Western Europe that we have presented 
in Table 1.  
 
Differences in country-specific entry costs, price levels, and in market size yield country-
specific critical productivity levels for the self-selection into the groups of domestic, export, 
and FDI firms.. Here, we only have information on FDI firms. To analyze whether firms’ self-
selection drives the differences of affiliates characteristics in Eastern and Western Europe, we 
thus look at the size distribution of German firms’ affiliates in both regions. 
 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here. --- 
 
Figure 1 displays size distribution of all German parents, parents that own affiliates only in 
Eastern Europe, and parents that own affiliates only in Western Europe. We look at two 
criteria of firm size: sales and employment. These yield different results. While parents with 
affiliates in Western Europe are larger if size is measured in terms of parents’ sales, parents 
with affiliates in Eastern Europe are larger if size is measured in terms of parents’ 
employment. Applying the reasoning of Helpman et al. (2004), more productive firms are 
active in Western Europe – because higher productivity translates into higher sales, not higher 
employment. However, if employment is the preferable measure of size because, for instance   10
employment is a real measure while sales are a nominal measure, larger and thus more 
productive firms are active in Eastern Europe.  
 
Finding different patterns according to different size measures, we cannot explain the 
differences across affiliates solely by self-selection of parents into the different groups. Hence 
the interplay of parent firm heterogeneity and country-specific fixed costs alone cannot 
explain differences of affiliates. Instead, firms that invest in Eastern and Western Europe 
differ with regard to their labor productivity. More specifically, the firms that invest in 
Eastern Europe have lower labor productivity than those that invest in Western Europe. In the 
context of the model by Helpman et al. (2004), this result could be taken as evidence for 
lower costs of entry into Eastern European markets. However, firms that invest in Eastern and 
Western Europe as well as their affiliates abroad also differ with regard to their capital 
intensities. Such differences in technologies are ruled out by this model. Hence differences in 
factor intensities suggest that affiliates in Eastern and Western Europe perform different 
functions.  
 
In Table 5, we provide tests which show whether the differences in Figure 1 are statistically 
significant. It presents Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality in size of parent firms than own 
affiliates in Eastern Europe and those that own affiliates in Western Europe. The tests confirm 
the results of Figure 1. Parents with affiliates in Western Europe are larger if measured in 
terms of sales and smaller if measured in terms of employment. 
 
--- Insert Table 5 about here. --- 
 
3.3  Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 
Overall, we find evidence for the importance of different motives for firms to engage in 
Eastern and in Western Europe. First, FDI into Eastern Europe is mostly unilateral. Activities 
of German multinational firms in Eastern Europe are much larger than Eastern European 
firms’ activities in Germany. In contrast, with Western Europe, German multinational firms’ 
activities are mostly bi-directional (see Table 2 and Buch et al. 2005). Second, the sector 
composition of FDI into the two regions differs. The most important difference is the 
importance of financial services for the West and transport equipment for the East. Third, the 
parent-affiliate structure for German firms shows that many foreign affiliates in Eastern and 
Western Europe are active in the same sector as the German parent. While this pattern is 
consistent with a proximity-concentration model, stressing the market access motive, it does 
not rule out the factor-proportion model, stressing production costs motives for 
internationalization. Fourth, firm-level heterogeneity in proximity-concentration models alone 
is not sufficient to explain the differences in affiliates’ characteristics. In particular, different 
measures of size yield different conclusions about average and minimum productivity of 
affiliates in both regions. In sum, while there is somewhat greater evidence for the production 
cost motive for Eastern Europe, this is not overwhelmingly so.  
 
4   Regression-Based  Evidence 
 
The descriptive statistics reported above have given a first impression of the motives of 
internationalization of German firms in different regions, but the overall picture has remained 
somewhat inconclusive. In this section, we present regression-based evidence that allows 
disentangling the different motives in a multivariate framework. We start using aggregated   11
and sector-level data. The empirical analysis is supplemented by firm-level regressions which 
allow taking parent characteristics into account. 
 
4.1 Aggregated  Data 
 
We rely on an extended gravity equation that has been used frequently in the empirical 
literature on the determinants of multinational activity. For our purposes, the key variable is a 
similarity index. Our similarity index takes values between 1 and 0, and a higher score implies 
that countries are more similar.
3 The difference between the GDP per capita of Germany and 
the GDP per capita of the host country is used as a proxy for similarity in terms of skills and 
human capital. GDP per capita is highly correlated with countries’ relative endowments with 
capital and, therefore, with the average capital intensity of production in a country.  Since 
internationalization of activities decreases in the similarity in factor endowments if the 
production cost motive dominates, whereas internationalization increases in similarity in 
factor endowments if the market access motive dominates, a negative coefficient on this index 
is evidence in favor of the production cost motive. A positive coefficient, in contrast, is 
evidence in favor of the market access motive. The baseline equation that we estimate is  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ijt jt jt jt ijt Distance Similarity GDP FDI ε β β β β + ⋅ + ⋅ + + = log log log 3 2 1 0  
 
where  ijt FDI  is foreign direct investment by sector i in country j in period t, and  ijt ε  is an 
error term. The dependent variable, GDP and distance are given in logs, and the resulting 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. A coefficient of, say, 0.6 on one of the logged 
explanatory variables (such as GDP) would imply that a 1% increase in this variables would 
trigger a 0.6% increase in the dependent variable (such as FDI). 
 
GDP is included to control for the size of countries, and we expect a positive sign. Distance is 
included to account for transportation and other distance-related costs, and we expect a 
negative sign. 
 
We use four different measures of German firms’ foreign activities: the sum of FDI stocks of 
all foreign affiliates, the mean of the FDI stock of the foreign affiliates, total affiliate sales, 
and the number of foreign affiliates. The distinction between FDI and the sales of foreign 
affiliates is important because affiliates sales are a more direct measure of the actual level of 
production of foreign affiliates than FDI. Splitting up the aggregated investment volume into 
the average foreign investment per affiliate and the number of affiliates that are active abroad 
provides information on the extensive and intensive margins of the adjustment to changes in 
exogenous variables such as market size or distance costs. 
 
Although we have, in principle, information on the foreign activities of German firms in more 
than 200 host countries, we lack reliable time series for quite a few of these countries, mostly 
low-income countries. Therefore, the effective sample size is restricted to a little over 100 
countries, including a large number of developing countries and emerging markets.  
 
Estimating equation (1) gives the average effect of the exogenous variables on German 
outward FDI. We want to compare this effect with the (average) effect for a sample from 
Eastern European countries. We therefore additionally include interactions of all explanatory 
                                                 
3   The index is calculated as one minus the ratio of abs (GDP per capita host – GDP per capita Germany) to 
max (GDP per capita host, GDP per capita Germany) .   12
variables with an Eastern European dummy. This dummy takes the value one if a country is a 
CEEC country and zero otherwise.  
 
Table 6 presents the estimates. The gravity variables GDP and distance have the expected 
positive and negative signs. Their coefficients have a size comparable to those usually found 
in the literature. For distance, the negative effect is driven by the number of affiliates. The 
mean volume of FDI, in contrast, increases in distance. 
 
--- Insert Table 6 about here. --- 
 
The most important variable for our analysis is the similarity variable. The positive coefficient 
found for the full sample points to a dominance of market access considerations.  
 
Moreover, our results suggest that the determinants of multinational activities do not differ 
significantly between Eastern Europe and the rest of the sample. There is only one significant 
difference for the Eastern Europe sub-sample: the interaction term effect of the similarity 
variable. This interaction term for mean FDI per affiliate is positive and significant, 
suggesting that affiliate size if measured in FDI is more strongly affected by similarity in 
Eastern Europe than the size of the average foreign affiliate. 
 
4.2 Sector-Level  Data 
 
Next, we exploit the sector dimension contained in our dataset. Since sectors differ in their 
factor intensities, the motive for internationalization is likely to differ as well. Rather than 
aggregating the dependent variable for each country, we now retain the sectoral dimension of 
the data. Hence we have a panel which has a sector-country cross-section dimension. Table 7 
shows results for each of the NACE sectors separately. 
 
--- Insert Table 7 about here. --- 
 
Country size is positive and significant for all sectors, except mining, wood, electricity and 
gas. There is a significantly larger effect of GDP for Eastern European countries in a number 
of sectors. 
 
As regards similarity, there is a relatively distinct pattern of positive and significant 
coefficients across sectors. This, as has been argued above, would be evidence in favor of the 
market access motive for internationalization. Similarity is insignificant for three sectors 
(paper products and publishing, coke and petroleum products, non-metallic mineral products), 
and we find a significantly negative effect only for the production of transport equipment. As 
shown in Table 3, this is one of the sectors which have a significantly higher share in 
activities in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe. As regards similarity, we find 
mostly insignificant differences of Eastern European coefficients. Thus, German firms on 
average do not pursue different internationalization strategies in the two regions. If the 
similarity coefficient for Eastern Europe differs significantly, it has the “wrong” positive sign. 
The market access motive would be even more important to Eastern Europe. In only two 
sectors, we find a significantly negative interaction term between similarity and our Eastern 
Europe dummy. These are the sectors wood products and furniture. This would be evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis that the production costs motive dominates for investment by these 
sectors in Eastern Europe.   13
Like the regressions using aggregated data, sector data reject significant differences of 
German multinational firms in Eastern Europe from their overall internationalization 
behavior. The market access motive dominates in almost all sectors, and it sometimes does so 
even more in Eastern Europe. This is in line with most of the evidence derived from analysis 
using aggregated data (Carr et al. 2001). According to the analyses using aggregated and 
sector data, different motives of internationalization are not the main reason for the 
differences in affiliate characteristics. 
 
4.3   Firm-Level Evidence 
 
So far, we have looked at differences in factor endowments across countries to discriminate 
between the two motives for going abroad. GDP per capita is, as was argued above, a proxy 
for the factor endowments of countries. Yet, there is a one-to-one correspondence of firm 
characteristics and factor endowments only if firms are symmetric. With heterogeneity and 
self-selection, the regression results using aggregated and sectoral data reported above thus 
provide only one part of the story. We therefore continue our analysis at the firm-level.  
We set up probit and tobit models to analyze firm-level determinants of firms that are active 
in Eastern Europe and of those that are active in Western Europe. The unit of analysis is the 
affiliate-parent pair. The dependent variable is set to one for each affiliate located in one of 
the eight countries in Eastern and Western Europe, respectively, and to zero otherwise. 
Overall, our sample comprises 12,129 pairs of German parents and their foreign affiliates. 
Data are for the year 2003 because information on the parents is contained in our dataset only 
since 2002. The number of observations used is the same in all regressions but the number of 
ones differs between the regressions analyzing Western and those analyzing Eastern European 
affiliates. Our dataset contains information on 1,378 affiliates of German firms in Eastern 
Europe and on 3,845 affiliates in Western Europe.
4 Thus, about 43% of all affiliates of 
German firms worldwide in our sample are located in one of the 16 countries in the two 
regions we analyze. The tobit model is set up in a similar way. Instead of a one for an affiliate 
located in Eastern (or Western) Europe, we use its size in terms of FDI as the dependent 
variable. 
 
--- Insert Table 8 about here. --- 
 
We explain the decision to invest in Eastern or Western Europe by several firm-level 
variables, a border dummy, and a set of dummies controlling for sector-specific fixed effects. 
We include three firm-specific variables. The age of the affiliate is included to account for the 
fact that younger firms are usually smaller in size. The size of the parent firm is included as a 
proxy for the productivity of the parent. The capital intensity of the parent and of the affiliate 
are included to check whether more labor-intensive parents are more likely to invest in 
Eastern Europe, which would be an indication that the production cost motive is important. 
We expect the size of the parent firm to influence the location decision. Smaller firms are 
more likely to engage in countries close to their home country if country-specific fixed costs 
to depend on distance. Thus, we expect a negative sign for both groups. As an additional 
proxy for size, we use the number of affiliates worldwide of a given parent. 
Moreover, political discussions in Germany stress the low barriers of entry in Eastern Europe 
which allow small and medium-sized firms to relocate their production to these countries. If 
this hypothesis was true, we would expect to find that being small increases the probability of 
investing in Eastern Europe.  
                                                 
4   Note that these numbers are not comparable to those in Table 1 because we consider only a subgroup of 
eight countries in each region.   14
However, our results provide evidence against this hypothesis. If anything, we find that the 
size of the parent has a positive impact on the probability of investing in Eastern Europe. The 
coefficient on size is negative, in contrast, for the Western European countries. Results from 
the tobit model support this finding. Hence our findings suggest that parent characteristics 
matter in the sense that larger parents tend to set up affiliates in Eastern Europe. This is in line 
with our descriptive statistics in Figure 1. 
 
Next, we are interested in whether capital-labor-ratios are important. If the production cost  
FDI motive dominates, we would expect firms which produce labor-intensive to be more 
prone to invest in Eastern Europe, where labor is more abundant and less expensive than in 
Germany or in Western Europe. In the Western European countries, in contrast, we would not 
expect firms to look for comparatively cheap labor. In these countries, the market access 
motive should rather dominate. Hence the capital-labor ratio of the parent firm should be 
negative in our Eastern Europe regression and insignificant for Western Europe. Although we 
find the negative sign in the Eastern Europe probit regression, the capital-labor ratio of the 
parent is not significant at the conventional levels of significance. Surprisingly, it is negative 
and significant for the Western European regression. One reason could be that the size of the 
parent and the capital-labor ratio are positively correlated. 
 
The capital-labor ratio of the affiliate has a negative sign for the Eastern European sample and 
a positive sign for the Western European sample. This is consistent with the expectation that 
affiliates in Eastern Europe are relatively more labor intensive. Note that our empirical 
approach does not allow discriminating whether this is due to the different functions that they 
perform or due to differences in factor endowments of countries. 
 
Table 9 looks uses the capital intensity of the affiliate as the dependent variable. We present 
four different specifications, using different measures for the size of the parent. Also, we 
include dummy variable for three regions, the previously used Central European countries, 
core Europe, as well as a second group of reform states, including Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Results show a clear and positive link between the size of the 
parent and the capital intensity of the affiliate. We obtain the expected negative signs for the 
two groups of Central and Eastern European countries (where affiliates are more labor 
intensive) as well as a positive sign for core Europe (where affiliates are less labor intensive). 
Also, more capital intensive parents tend to have more capital intensive affiliates. 
 
--- Insert Table 9 about here. --- 
 
Returning to Table 8, we expect the age of an affiliate to affect its size. It is a long-established 
fact that older firms are larger (Evans 1987, Cabral and Mata 2003). Yet, we might have 
difficulties to find this relationship in our data for two reasons. First, we do not know the 
exact age of each affiliate since we can trace individual affiliates only since 1996. Hence we 
cannot distinguish affiliates that were established already before 1996 from those that were 
established in 1996. Second, in Eastern Europe, the nature of the privatization process might 
distort the typical relationship between age and size. In many Eastern European countries, 
large-scale privatization has gained steam only in the second half of the 1990s. This holds 
particularly for public utilities and the banking sectors, i.e. for sectors in which German firms 
are quite active (Table 3). This can explain why we find a negative correlation between size 
and age in the tobit regressions for the Eastern European sample (see Table 8). For the 
Western European sample, in contrast, we find the expected positive correlation.  
   15
Finally, we include a border dummy variable at the level of the German state, which is set at 
one if a German state and a foreign country share a border and to zero otherwise. The border 
dummy drops out of the East European probit specification because of colinearity. The border 
dummy perfectly predicts investment behavior for some East German states. To share a 




5    Summary and Conclusions 
 
The size and the labor intensity of foreign affiliates in Eastern Europe are focal points of 
discussions on the risks and benefits of foreign direct investment. In the West, people fear 
adverse labor market consequences of an increasing amount of FDI into labor intensive 
foreign affiliates. These consequences might be particularly adverse if not only large firms 
relocate production but if also small and mid-sized firms start investing abroad. In the East, 
entry of foreign firms raises fears of greater labor market instability and greater competition 
for the incumbent firms. 
 
In this paper, we have started from the observation that characteristics of foreign affiliates of 
German firms in Eastern and Western Europe indeed differ. On average, affiliates in Eastern 
Europe are smaller and employ more labor. Interpreting these differences and drawing 
conclusions with regard to potential labor market impacts, however, requires disentangling 
three different reasons for differences in affiliate structures. 
 
First, affiliates in Eastern Europe might be more labor intensive than their Western 
counterparts because German firms fragment their production process and locate labor-
intensive stages in the relatively low-wage Eastern European countries. We find that, for some 
manufacturing sectors, the production cost motive for internationalization is indeed important. 
Overall, however, regressions using aggregated data show that a large part of German FDI 
into Eastern Europe is driven by the market access motive. 
 
Second, differences in parent characteristics have an impact on differences in the structure of 
foreign affiliates. Contrary to expectations voiced in the public debate, we find the size of the 
parent to have a positive impact on the probability of investing in Eastern Europe. Size has a 
negative impact on the probability of investing in core Europe, in contrast. This contradicts 
the common perception that Eastern enlargement has been a key trigger of small and mid-
sized firms into foreign markets. It is rather the larger parents that are active in Eastern 
Europe. 
 
Third, differences in factor intensities of the parent affect the probability of investing abroad. 
Yet, more labor intensive parents as compared to the average German multinational tend to be 
active in Eastern and Western Europe. This is in line with the public policy debate regarding 
activity in the East – but the finding regarding firms active in Western Europe is probably 
surprising.  
 
Fourth, we find that the age of the affiliate has a significant impact on its size. Older affiliates 
in Eastern Europe tend to be smaller while older affiliates in Western Europe tend to be larger 
than their younger counterparts. While the correlation between age and size in Western 
Europe meets expectations, the negative correlation in Eastern Europe is likely to be   16
influenced by the nature of the transformation process. The start of large-scale privatization in 
the mid-1990s may particularly affect our results.  
 
Overall, the aim of our paper has been to provide a detailed account of the patterns of 
specialization and investment in Eastern Europe, using firm-level data from Germany as an 
important source country of FDI. In future work, it would be interesting to cross-check these 
results with comparable datasets from other countries. Our data have also not allowed 
studying the self-selection of firms into export versus FDI firms. Having firm-level 
information on FDI and exports would be highly desirable to test implications of recent 
theoretical models more directly. 
   17
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7   Data  Appendix 
 
The Deutsche Bundesbank has been carrying out annual full sample surveys on direct 
investment stocks pursuant to the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (Außenwirtschafts-
verordnung) since 1976. The data base used in this paper was compiled solely for academic 
research purposes, and it goes back to 1989. (For details see Lipponer 2002a, 2002b, or 
Deutsche Bundesbank 2003.) Time series for individual enterprises, however, are available 
only from 1996 to 2003. For semi-aggregated data (by country or sector), data are available 
for the years 1989–2003.  
 
The data base contains mainly those data from the foreign affiliates’ balance sheets that are 
needed to calculate direct investment stocks. The data contain only limited information about 
the reporting firm, i.e. about the German headquarters (or, in the case of FDI in Germany, 
about the foreign parent). Essentially, with regard to the German investor, information is 
restricted to the sector in which the firm is active. Similar sectoral information is available for 
the foreign affiliate. Since the year 2000, the data also contain information about the reporting 
firm such as its turnover, assets, or employment.  
 
In the period October 1993 through February 2002, German enterprises had to report their 
international capital links if the balance sheet total of the foreign affiliates exceeded € 5 
million (for minority participation rights subject to reporting requirements). In the case of 
majority participation rights as well as branches and permanent establishments, foreign 
affiliates reported whether their balance sheet total was more than € 500,000. Indirect 
participating interests had to be reported if a “dependent” foreign affiliate had a holding of 
10% or more in another enterprise. Since March 2002, a uniform reporting threshold of 3 
million euro has been in place. 
 Table 1: Regional Breakdown of Activities of German MNEs, 2003 
CEECs = Central and Eastern European Countries (Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine)  
 FDI 
stocks 




Affiliate sales   Employees   Number of 
affiliates 
  (€ mn)  (€ bn)  (1,000)  (total) (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 


















European Union  300,961  571.6  1,619  10,167  45.2  42.2  36.0  45.1 
United States  224,037  356.0  766  3,396  33.6  26.3  17.0  15.1 
Other 49,113  154.3  368  2,625  7.4  11.4  8.2  11.6 
 
Transition Countries  46,474  139.9  1,021  3,533  7.0  10.3  22.7  15.7 
CEECs 34,866  98.8  722  2,583  5.2  7.3  16.1  11.5 
China 7,278  24.4  160  566  1.1  1.8  3.5  2.5 
Other 4,330  16.7  139  384  0.7  1.2  3.1  1.7 
Developing countries  45,255  131.2  724  2,830  6.8  9.7  16.1  12.5 
Latin America  20,382  47.3  288  1,051  3.1  3.5  6.4  4.7 
Asia 20,551  68.2  331  1,395  3.1  5.0  7.4  6.2 
Other 4,322  15.8  105  384  0.6  1.2  2.3  1.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the database MIDI (International Capital Links) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
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Table 2: OECD Countries as Sources and Destinations of FDI 
CEECs includes the Czech Republic, Poland, and the Slovak Republic; Core EU includes Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; Other Europe 
includes Finland, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland, Oother OECD includes Australia, Canada, Japan and Korea. 
Total source = 100%  Total destination = 100%  Destination









Australia  n.a.  25.74  -0.02  53.65 7.78 1.65  n.a. 1.53  -0.01 5.09 1.85 2.03 
Austria  15.95  36.84 6.74 8.02 2.02 0.70 9.41 0.56 0.64 0.20 0.12 0.52 
Canada  0.20  17.37 1.34  48.83 2.86 4.23 0.12 2.43 1.17  10.90 1.60 4.77 
Czech Republic  35.20  13.48 2.50 1.95 0.21 0.29 0.62 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Denmark  1.96  25.01  11.59  17.09 5.43 0.55 2.98 0.99 2.85 1.08 0.85 1.35 
Finland  0.75  37.65  30.01  15.07 1.81 0.40 0.93 1.21 6.00 0.77 0.23 1.10 
France  1.00  30.74 5.11  25.16 9.44 3.39  10.27 8.19 8.48  10.71  10.04 9.10 
Germany  2.81  36.23  5.61  27.69  3.91  7.39  31.38  10.50  10.12  12.82  4.53  9.90 
Greece n.a.  20.98  0.03  0.00 0.00 0.14  n.a. 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 
Italy  1.21  39.31 8.04  11.23 1.93 1.72 5.17 4.36 5.56 1.99 0.86 3.79 
Japan  n.a.  17.71 0.92  50.59 7.36 1.89  n.a. 3.04 0.99  13.86 5.04 5.86 
Korea  1.76 7.74 0.26  28.20 4.84 0.44 1.08 0.12 0.03 0.72 0.31 0.54 
Netherlands  1.97  29.86 6.71  25.89 3.50 9.84  14.10 5.53 7.74 7.66 2.59 6.33 
Poland  3.20  25.97 6.20 9.37  -0.05 0.52 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Portugal  n.a. 8.56 0.18 2.63 0.30 0.31 0.49 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.37 
Slovak  Republic  51.43  21.13 1.39 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Sweden  n.a.  43.90  10.60  18.79 1.76 1.86  n.a. 3.33 5.00 2.28 0.53 2.59 
Switzerland  1.06  34.33 2.06  23.10 3.80 2.78 5.74 4.81 1.80 5.18 2.13 4.79 
United  Kingdom  0.24 43.06  4.79 30.00  4.23 10.56  5.04 23.93 16.57 26.63  9.39 18.97 
United  States  n.a. 36.16  6.54  0.00 18.05 21.37 12.15 29.32 33.03  0.00 58.43 27.68 
n.a. = not available 
Source: OECD Foreign Direct Investment Statistics (2003). 
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Table 3: Sectoral Breakdown of Activities of German MNEs in Eastern and Western Europe, 2002 
  Eastern Europe  Western Europe 
  Sector classified with respect to German 
parent 
Sector classified with respect to foreign 
affiliate 
Sector classified with respect to German 
parent 



































  (€ mn,%) (€ bn,%)  (1000,%)  (€ bn,%) (€ 
mn,%)  (€ bn,%)  (1000,%)  (bn,%)  (€ 
mn,%)  (€ bn, %) (1000,%)  (bn,%)  (€ mn,%)  (€ bn,%) (1000, %)  (bn,%) 
Eastern Europe      
Total 33,519.8 96.4  657.7 139.5 33,519.8 96.4 657.7 139.5 331,078 458.4 1,234.8 2,756.1 331,078 458.4 1,234.8 2,756.1 
Manufacturing 70.6 67.8  64.9 38.4 66.7 62 66.8 34.9 59.3 62.3 57.6 23.2 19.2 35.2 44.8 6.4 
Food products  3.9 5.9  3.7 2.3 3.7 4.6 4.1 2.1 2.8 3.3 2.4 1.1 1.3 1.5 2.1  … 
Textiles 1.2 1.3  2.9 … … … 3.0 … … 1.3 … … … … …  … 
Paper & publishing  1.4 1.4  1.9 … 1.3 1.2 1.8 … 3.4 1.4 1.8 1.3 … … 1.1 … 
Chemicals 3.4 3.2  2.6 1.5 3.3 2.3 2.1 1.3 14.3 10.9 8.9 5.2 6.9 8.7 7.1  2.0 
Rubber & plastics  3.1 3.0  3.4 1.4 2.7 2.7 3.4 1.6 1.1 2.0 2.9 … … 1.4 2.3  … 
Non-metallic 
minerals 5.9 3.0  3.9 2.9 6.0 3.0 4.0 2.7 2.7 1.4 2.4 … … 1.2 2.2  … 
Basic metals  3.1 2.3  3.9 1.4 2.9 1.9 4.0 1.2 1.9 4.0 6.5 … … 2.5 4.5  … 
Machinery 4.3 3.5  4.1 1.9 2.9 2.4 3.8 1.1 3.1 5.9 8.0 1.1 1.4 3.5 6.4  … 
Electrical & optical 
equipment 7.4 7.0  11.4 4.6 5.8 6.2 12.5 2.7 5.2 7.1 10.8 2.4 2.8 4.5 7.0  … 
Transport equipment 20.0 22.6  15.4 9.2 21.1 21.6 16.1 8.3 8.2 19.7 9.3 4.8 1.7 5.9 8.2 … 
Electricity 15.4 11.9  7.4 10.6 14.3 11.8 7.3 11.2 15.2 4.1 1.7 4.7 2.0 3.8 1.8 1.2 
Construction … 1.3  1.8 … … 1.2 1.6 … … … 1.1 … … … 1.0  … 
Services 28.3 31.6  34.6 61.4 31.0 37.7 32.6 61.3 40.3 37.2 42.0 76.6 43.7 64.2 54.2 79.6 
Wholesale 7.6 18.6  15.1 6.3 10.3 24.8 14.7 6.6 6.7 18.5 15.6 2.7 10.5 44.7 26.8 3.9 
Transport & 
communication 7.4 5.6  7.5 8.5 7.6 6.0 8.0 9.2 5.6 8.2 11.3 5.6 1.3 8.6 11.0 1.4 
Financial services  8.3 3.8  6.8 42.0 7.4 2.8 5.8 38.8 23.5 6.4 8.5 66.4 26.8 6.2 6.0 72.3 
Business services  3.9 2.8  3.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 2.1 6.1 4.0 3.2 4.8 1.7 4.7 3.9 8.8 1.9 
Holdings n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 1.9 … … 3.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 36.9 … … 13.9 
Shares below 1% of the total are not disclosed because of confidentiality reasons. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the database MIDI (International Capital Links) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.Table 4: Number of Foreign Affiliates in Eastern Europe by the Sector of the Parent Firm and Sector of the Affiliate, 2003 
d = undisclosed for confidentiality reasons, Sectoral classification: 1 = agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry, 2 = mining and quarrying, 3 = manufacture of food products, 
beverages and tobacco, 4 = manufacture of textiles, textile products, leather and leather products, 5 = manufacture of wood and wood products, 6 = manufacture of pulp, paper, 
paper products, publishing and printing, 7 = manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, 8 = manufacture of chemicals, chemical products, and man-made 
fibres, 9 = manufacture of rubber and plastic products, 10 = manufacture of non-metallic mineral products, 11 = manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, 12 = 
manufacture of machinery and equipment n,e,c,, 13 = manufacture of electrical and optical equipment, 14 = manufacture of transport equipment, 15 = manufacture of furniture 
and manufacturing n.e.c., 16 =  electricity, gas and water supply, 17 = construction, 18 = wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods, 19 = hotels and restaurants, 20 = transport, storage, and communication, 21 = financial intermediation, 22 = real estate, renting and business activities, 
consulting, 23 = education, waste management, research and development, public administration and defence and compulsory social security, 24 = holdings. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the database MIDI (International Capital Links) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Sector foreign affiliate  Sector 
parent  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1  5        3 d 
2   14     d 4   d d 3  
3  d  92      29 3  
4     35   d d d  13 d  
5      8  d   d 3 5  
6       42   8 6 3 
7         7  
8   d     53 3 d   d 60 d d d d 
9       d 61 d d 5  15 d 
10   8     d 102   d 3 d 4 
11     d   4 d 102 5 d 3  36 5  
12      d  d 11 3 9 66 d 4  59 3  
13     d   3 4 110 10  44 7 5 d 
1 4        d 7 1 0 7   d 1 8 648dd  
15       d   27 d  
16       d   84 d d 3 13 
17   d     d d 3   27 5 4  
1 8  d   1 2  5  5  dd36 1 23 1 84  6dd 2 1 9 dd 3 7 4  
19         d  
20       d d  66 d 3 8 
21   d      d d 125 52 d 
2 2  d   5  d  d   868d  ddd 2 4dd7 2 1 5 7  
23 5  3 5 d d 4 d 4 5 4 d 3 d 9 d 17 21 4   24
Table 5:   Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Equality: Size of Parent Firms Owning Affiliates in Eastern versus in Western Europe 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test) determines whether two datasets differ significantly. The KS-test has the advantage of making no assumption about the distribution of 
data. The null hypothesis is equality of both distributions. In the first line results are presented of a one-sided test that evaluates whether parents that own affiliates only in Eastern 
Europe are smaller than parent that own affiliates only in Western European. The maximal difference in the cumulative distributions is positive, thus the null of equality is not 
rejected against the alternative hypothesis that parents owning affiliates in Eastern Europe are smaller with respect to employment. Rejected at the one percent level of 
significance is equality of both distributions against the alternative that parents with affiliates only in Western Europe are smaller with respect to employment. This result is given 
in line two. Taken together we can reject equality of both distributions at the one percent level of significance.  
Smaller group  Difference  p-value 
Size criteria  Log employment   
Parents with affiliates only in Eastern Europe  0.0011  0.999 
Parents with affiliates only in Western Europe  – 0.3184***  0.000 
Combined K-S  0.3184***  0.000 
Size criteria  Log sales   
Parents with affiliates only in Eastern Europe  0.111***  0.000 
Parents with affiliates only in Western Europe  0.000  1.000 
Combined K-S  0.111***  0.000 
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Table 6: Regression Results Aggregated Data 
The baseline regression that we estimate is: log(Yit)=α0 + β1Xit + β2Xi  + t + εit, where Yit is the activity German multinationals in country i at time t,  Xit are the time-varying 
explanatory variables for country i (GDP, similarity index, etc.), Xi are the time invariant explanatory variables for country i (distance), t is the time fixed effect, and εit is the 
error term. Results reported in this Table have been obtained using the cross-sectional time-series linear model using feasible generalized least squares (XTGLS) in Stata. This 
command allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and/or heteroscedasticity across panels. Dependent variables 
(with the exception of the sales-ratio), GDP, and distance are in logs. Sales are total sales of German firms’ foreign affiliates, including intra-firm sales. Data are aggregated over 
all affiliates of German firms in a particular host country. Number of affiliates is the total number of affiliates in a given host country. Data for 1995–2001; a full set of time 
dummies is included in all regressions (not reported). Absolute values of the z-statistic are given in parentheses: *, ** and *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  Volume of FDI  Mean FDI  Sales of foreign affiliates  Number of affiliates 
Log GDP  0.66***  0.23***  0.62***  0.47*** 
 [16.77]  [9.95]  [19.41]  [21.68] 
Similarity 3.03***  0.67***  3.48***  2.36*** 
 [11.16]  [4.24]  [16.16]  [15.50] 
Log distance  –0.17**  0.09**  –0,07  –0.18*** 
 [2.42]  [2.15]  [1.22]  [4.28] 
Log GDP * Eastern Europe  –0,12  –0,13  0,06  0,15 
 [0.42]  [0.82]  [0.23]  [0.81] 
Similarity * Eastern Europe  –1,52  3.84*  –0,04  –3,69 
 [0.53]  [1.93]  [0.01]  [1.22] 
Log distance * Eastern Europe  0,57  0,4  –0,11  –0,35 
 [0.55]  [0.70]  [0.12]  [0.54] 
Constant –3.64***  1.89***  –9.56***  –6.75*** 
 [3.33]  [2.94]  [11.07]  [11.66] 
Observations 1138  1138  1159  1181 
Number of key  107  107  107  108 
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Table 7: Regression Results Sectoral Data 
Results reported in this Table have been obtained using an feasible generalized least squares estimator which accounts for the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within and cross-
sectional correlation and/or heteroscedasticity across panels. The dependent variable (sales of foreign affiliates), GDP, and distance are given in logs. Data have been aggregated 
at a sectoral level, i.e. the data set contains one entry per sector and host country per year. We use data for the years 1990–2001. Sectors are defined following NACE. All 
regressions include a full set of time dummies. Robust t-values in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 Agriculture Mining  Food  Textiles  Wood  Paper & printing Petroleum  Chemicals  Plastics 
Non-metallic 
minerals 
Log GDP  0.14*  –0.01  0.43***  0.37***  0.07 0.87***  1.03***  0.80***  0.86***  0.66*** 
 [1.84]  [0.11]  [10.10]  [8.42]  [0.63]  [13.15] [13.00]  [21.65]  [14.89]  [14.18] 
Similarity 3.90***  4.14***  0.64**  1.29*** 4.50***  0.00  0.1  1.93***  0.78***  –0.11 
 [8.10]  [7.21]  [2.23]  [4.27]  [4.74]  [0.00] [0.22]  [7.46]  [2.58]  [0.36] 
Log distance  0.87***  0.1  –0.83***  0.09 0.72***  –0.38***  –0.21* 0.1  –0.61***  –0.86*** 
 [4.38]  [0.80]  [10.73]  [1.29]  [3.04]  [4.27] [1.75]  [1.44]  [7.08]  [11.62] 
Log GDP * Eastern Europe  –1.2  0.76***  0.22* 0.1  0.1  0.21  0.31 0.2  0.70***  0.55*** 
 [1.64]  [3.98]  [1.85]  [0.31]  [0.40]  [0.62] [0.57]  [1.51]  [5.04]  [3.24] 
Similarity * Eastern Europe  52.25*  –0.18 3.21**  –4.68  –14.19***  –0.37  –11.72 0.82  –0.94 4.51*** 
 [1.82]  [0.04]  [1.99]  [0.96]  [4.48]  [0.04] [1.41]  [0.35]  [0.20]  [2.62] 
Log distance * Eastern Europe  3.6  –2.59*** –0.77*  –0.16  0.27  –0.73 –0.73  –0.56  –2.54***  –2.03*** 
 [1.59]  [3.32]  [1.79]  [0.13]  [0.31]  [0.55] [0.35]  [1.06]  [5.78]  [3.59] 
Constant –3.37*  7.09***  4.50***  –1.36  –1.89 –11.06***  –14.82***  –10.86***  –9.17***  –1.25 
 [1.70]  [4.05]  [4.84]  [1.27]  [0.76]  [6.19] [7.63]  [11.57]  [5.91]  [0.95] 
Observations  304  408  493  617  292 396  363 809 463  422 
Number of groups  42  56  56  66  38  48  47  81  53  54 













Log GDP  0.70***  0.84***  0.74***  1.15***  0.29*** 0.33*** 0.75***  0.48***  0.64*** 0.78*** 
 [12.32]  [17.12]  [15.15]  [13.16]  [4.36]  [5.55] [20.99]  [10.54]  [12.01]  [18.61] 
Similarity 1.13***  1.66***  2.03***  –0.94** 1.47*** 3.11*** 3.20***  2.08***  3.88*** 2.57*** 
 [3.64]  [5.43]  [6.66]  [2.55]  [4.19]  [9.18] [13.95]  [8.84]  [11.22]  [9.55] 
Log distance  –0.47***  –0.39***  –0.12  –0.46*** 0.04  0.17*  –0.10*  –0.25***  –0.16*  –0.30*** 
 [5.67]  [5.96]  [1.64]  [4.76]  [0.38]  [1.77] [1.75]  [4.38]  [1.91] [4.56] 
Log GDP * Eastern Europe  0.40**  –0.25  0.25 0.28 0.47***  0.65***  0.41** 0.17  0.39**  0.44** 
 [2.25]  [1.24]  [1.51]  [1.44]  [3.28]  [7.06] [2.09]  [1.02]  [2.09] [2.32] 
Similarity * Eastern Europe  3.92  12.05** 5.24**  –1.15  –5.39***  7.35*  –4.75 –3.77  –9.42**  –6.54** 
 [0.72]  [1.99]  [2.26]  [0.38]  [3.06]  [1.67] [1.19]  [1.09]  [2.46] [2.16] 
Log distance * Eastern Europe  –1.58***  0.77 –0.89  –0.64  –1.39***  –2.34*** –1.25*  –0.62  –1.12*  –1.35** 
 [2.60]  [1.03]  [1.56]  [0.85]  [2.70]  [8.64] [1.75]  [1.13]  [1.81] [1.98] 
Constant –4.67***  –9.19***  –8.30***  –18.74***  –1.16 –2.96*  –8.87***  –1.78  –5.85***  –9.41*** 
 [2.97]  [7.98]  [7.28]  [9.28]  [0.67]  [1.96] [10.25]  [1.55]  [4.14] [8.14] 
Observations  578 616  719 377 388 488 958  830  719 690 
Number  of  groups  60 60  72 52 48 60 96  94  80 79   27
Table 8: Regression Results Firm-Level Data 
Central and Eastern European countries = Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Core Europe = Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
  Central and Eastern European Countries  Core Europe 
  Probit   Tobit   Probit   Tobit 
Turnover parent  0.00  0.01***  0.44*** 0.37***  0.00  –0.01***  –0.01 –0.331*** 
 [0.82]  [3.69]  [2.90]  [2.69]  [0.91] [3.89] [0.13] [4.46] 
Log capital intensity of the parent  –0.01    0.14   –0.01*   0.02   
  [1.29]  [0.66]  [1.84]  [0.13]  
Log capital intensity of the affiliate    –0.06***    –3.54***   0.07***  1.89*** 
   [8.61]  [9.70]  [6.69]   [10.27] 
Total number of affiliates of   –0.01 –0.01  –1.40***  –0.48**  –0.02 –0.02**  –0.56***  –0.44*** 
parent [1.36]  [0.92]  [5.69]  [2.14] [1.29] [2.00] [4.14] [3.77] 
Affiliate older than 1996      –2.18***  –3.69***      1.78***  2.20*** 
     [4.25]  [7.08]    [6.33]  [8.28] 
State border      27.31***  25.07*** 0.60***  0.58*** 11.63***  10.15*** 
      [16.00] [15.72] [19.06] [19.09] [23.02] [22.27] 
Constant     –9.96  –26.81***     –8.25  1.70 
     [1.39]  [4.94]    [1.42]  [0.58] 
Observations  8194 7754 8269 7793 8261 7789 8269 7793 
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Table 9: Determinants of the Capital Intensity of the Affiliate 
The dependent variable is the capital-labor ratio of the foreign affiliate. The Table presents results of OLS regressions for the year 2003, using robust standard errors. CEEC1 = 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. CEEC3 = Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Core Europe = 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Turnover parent  0.05***       
 [7.65]       
Assets parent    0.06***     
   [7.67]     
Employment parent      0.06***   
     [7.67]   
Dummy CEEC1 = 1  -0.32***  -0.30***  -0.29***  -0.30*** 
 [10.79]  [10.66]  [10.31]  [10.58] 
Dummy CEEC2 = 1  -0.36***  -0.32***  -0.31***  -0.31*** 
 [6.38]  [6.31]  [6.12]  [6.11] 
Dummy Core Europe = 1  0.10***  0.10***  0.10***  0.09*** 
 [5.26]  [5.63]  [5.39]  [5.18] 
Total number of affiliates -0.06***  -0.06***  -0.07***  0,01 
 [5.29]  [5.70]  [5.95]  [0.87] 
Log capital-labor ratio parent 0.07***  0  0.05***  -0,01 
 [6.82]  [0.62]  [5.48]  [1.54] 
Constant -2.82***  -0.86***  -2.67***  -0.63* 
 [7.28]  [2.62]  [7.03]  [1.89] 
Observations 6209  7241  7135  7252 
R-squared 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.07 
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